Nicolas Gvosdev
Facing the Facts on Terror
This week, President Bush
praised the contributions made by Pakistan and Iraq in the war on
terror. On Thursday, he specifically cited the “increasing
capability of the Iraqi forces” as one of the reasons why “al-Qaeda
is on the run in Iraq.” Earlier this week, after meeting Yousuf Raza
Gilani, the prime minister of Pakistan, at the White House, the
president proceeded to proclaim that “Pakistan is a strong ally” in
America’s fight against Islamist extremism.
But ally does not translate
into surrogate. And U.S. frustration with Iraq and Pakistan has
emerged, in part, because Iraqis and Pakistanis are not prepared to
make all of America’s enemies their own. For good reason, Gilani and
Pakistan’s military establishment, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s
government and the Sunni “Sons of Iraq”—all are prepared to ally
with Washington against al-Qaeda—but an al-Qaeda defined in limited
terms as the bin Laden/Zawahiri organization.
After all, al-Qaeda has some
nasty habits—and has not hesitated to display them even to
sympathetic Sunni. Tribal leaders who initially welcomed the group
found, over time, their own authority and prerogatives under
attack—and discovered that these warriors of the faith were just as
willing to strike at them in addition to the “infidels.” And
al-Qaeda and its affiliates have demonstrated that they are
perfectly willing to sacrifice the lives and well-being of those who
live within “the base”—whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan or
Mesopotamia—to further their own goals. It hasn’t escaped Pakistani
intelligence analysts that, had Osama bin Laden not struck the
United States on 9/11, the Taliban would continue to be ruling over
most of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s position in that country would be
largely unassailable. Sunni in central Iraq who hoped that al-Qaeda
in Iraq would be their ticket to returning to positions of
prominence and power in post-Saddam Iraq discovered otherwise—while
the group’s militantly anti-Shia stance and bloody attacks on Shia
civilians galvanized a sectarian response and strengthened the
influence of Iran. And it is patently obvious why Iraqi Shia would
want to take the fight to al-Qaeda.
But a fight against a more
generalized “Islamic radicalism” is not in the cards. The government
in Baghdad is happy to fight Sunni radicals, and may even welcome
American aid to lessen the need to continue to depend on Iranian
support for solidifying its position within Iraq. But to join in
with Washington so the United States can put meaningful pressure on
Iran, in the name of fighting terrorism? That’s not going to happen.
Attempts to prove an Iran–al-Qaeda link don’t carry much weight with
al-Maliki and his team.
For their part, the “Sons of
Iraq” have been prepared to accept American payments to organize and
to drive out from their provinces al-Qaeda elements and “foreign
fighters.” Unlike the Baghdad government, these Sunni are quite
leery of Tehran—and want to combat its influence in Iraq. But this
is not out of any sense of solidarity with the “war on terror”—it is
to regain the initiative and to at least establish Sunni self-rule
in those parts of Iraq where they form the majority. And neither
Shia nor Sunni in Iraq are prepared to broaden their anti–al-Qaeda
stand by coming out against Arab Islamist groups which oppose
Israel. Iraqis may come out to fight against al-Qaeda, but don’t
expect meaningful action or even denunciations of groups such as
Hezbollah, whose star has risen high among both Sunni and Shia since
the 2006 conflict with Israel.
The Pakistani establishment
has tried to walk a tightrope—focusing efforts on dealing with
al-Qaeda—meaning the cells that target Western countries, staffed by
“outsiders.” But they are not prepared to write off the Taliban
altogether, as well as the jihadi groups that continue to be active
in Kashmir. Fearing Indian “encirclement,” Islamabad is not going to
abandon potential clients, especially given the Indian “tilt” of
Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul.
Reports from the region
consistently point to continued assistance from Pakistan’s
intelligence services to militants, notably Jalaluddin Haqqani, who
is widely believed to be responsible for the attack on the Indian
embassy in Afghanistan last month. This has led some U.S. analysts
to conclude that Pakistan’s intelligence and military establishment
is actively sabotaging Washington’s attempts to eliminate militant
groups.
The desire of many in the
region to limit their cooperation with the United States to fighting
one specific organization—al-Qaeda—rather than joining in broader
efforts to “drain the swamp”—raises a real challenge for U.S.
policy. “Indigenous allies” are critical if America is to be able to
penetrate regions and networks that have proven difficult for
outsiders to navigate. But these partners have their limits.
The challenge for the next
president is whether or not Washington is prepared to shift its
emphasis, from “draining” to “containing” the swamps. If, as Peter
Bergen and other terrorism experts suggest, there are still cadres
in Western countries looking for support, guidance and material from
sanctuaries such as the Pakistani tribal areas—and if there are
limits to what the local militaries are prepared to do—and the
United States is not prepared to countenance renewed long-term
occupations of such sanctuary areas, then what options are open?
Would the U.S. settle for enforceable agreements based on the
September 2006
North Waziristan peace pact?
To some extent, this is what
has evolved in the Sunni areas of Iraq—a bargain that in return for
eliminating al-Qaeda installations and driving out their personnel,
the Sunni are to be left alone to run their own affairs. Perhaps a
renewed effort in Pakistan to get provisions of agreements with
various tribal regions that stipulate “no cross-border infiltration”
and call for all foreign elements to be expelled is the way forward.
Ever since the battle at
Tora Bora in December 2001, it has been clear that America’s
regional partners in the fight against “Islamic-inspired” terrorism
had their limits; they were not going to fight and die for U.S.
objectives. The aid we receive is indispensable but flawed. We can
either learn to live with that gap—or fill it ourselves.
Nikolas Gvosdev, a
professor at the Naval War College, is a senior editor at The
National Interest. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
01.08. 2008 The National
Interest
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