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NSPM IN ENGLISH

NSPM IN ENGLISH - Serbia, Democracy and the issue of Kosovo and Metohija

 

 

Dušan Proroković

NEUTRAL SERBIA

Advocating a new war against the entire world; the return of Serbia to the 1990s; abandoning the European path; inevitability of new political and diplomatic isolation and economic and trade sanctions; sending a wrong message on Serbia ... These are just some of the allegations leveled against the Democratic Party of Serbia, headed by the current Prime Minister of Serbia Vojislav Koštunica. These allegations are triggered in the wake of the party's adoption of a new program in which a reference is made to the commitment of Serbia 's future military neutrality.

If Serbia is to be militarily neutral, it means that it shall not seek NATO membership. Although many were quick to note that this was not a question for Serbia but for NATO – because it is NATO that will make a decision whether they want to accept us in their membership or not, the above statements of Serbian NATO membership advocates still speak more of the nervousness within their ranks.

Some of these qualifications, for example, to the effect that by its military neutrality Serbia actually declares a war on NATO or that such position will lead to renewed isolation, sound more like threats and should be understood as some sort of pressure on the Serbian public. Nevertheless, some of them should be responded to. Especially the statements that military neutrality automatically implies abandoning Serbia's European orientation , the exclusion of Serbia from the “global security system“ and slowing down further reforms in the defense system, which may ultimately be very costly .

First of all, a distinction should be made between EU and NATO. No matter how much the background history of NATO and EU was connected, the current ties between NATO and EU are totally different. European Union increasingly dislikes that connections be drawn between these two organizations. Three years ago, European Defense Agency was established in Brussels, while the process of structuring a joint European military force (EUFOR) and joint European rapid reaction force are under-way ( Euro-gendarmerie ). There are two reasons for such action on the part of EU . The first is that in the process of decision-making European States are less and less able to participate on a footing of equality ,i.e. in way defined by NATO foundation acts. The dominant role in the decision-making process is played by USA. It is no secret that a number of NATO member states opposed the intervention against the FR of Yugoslavia, and that an even bigger number opposed the intervention in Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq , “it was the last straw “. In many European capitals, there are concerns that European NATO members will be able to play only two roles in the future: either support US actions and participate with the US army in future interventions or bear the consequences caused by the interventions of the “coalition of the willing” even though they would not participate in them.

At the time when NATO was established, there was a clear strategic commitment of then members to form a military alliance as a counter balance to the Eastern Bloc. However, there is a legitimate question now to what extent strategic interests of the USA and EU converge today. At the same time, it should be recalled that the USA is taking part in NATO decision-making with 90 per cent share while it contributes only 25 per cent to its budget. The other reason causing concern among the Brussels officials is the position of the European arms and military equipment manufacturers. While the US market is closed to European manufacturers, the European States are often compelled to purchase US arms and military equipment. Back in the early 1990s, Zbigniew Brezinski wrote that drawing former communist States to NATO means also efficient struggle against powerful European competition. Despite many attempts by the European manufacturers to resolve this issue, no solution has been reached. Over the past few years, US dominance in NATO East European States even grew .

Speaking of differences between EU and NATO, it should be noted that all EU states are not automatically NATO members . Austria, Cyprus , Fin land, Ireland , Malta and Sweden are EU members but not NATO members - all for reasons of their own . Six out of 27 EU members equals 22 per cent. So, the number of EU members that are not NATO members is not negligible . Therefore, Serbia wishing to join EU and not NATO is not seeking to be granted any special concession from EU. It is just invoking the existing examples .

Finally , all those referring to the “global security system“ have to admit that EU membership itself provides a proper “security guarantee“. Surely, the European Union would not tolerate any action against one of its members and would resort to all political, diplomatic and, if necessary, military means to protect it . In any case, the EU “Second pillar” is joint defense and foreign policy which will be feasible in an operative sense after the establishment of the European military force .

Second, “global security system“ needs to be defined. The picture of the world is rapidly changing. US-led military interventions against Afghanistan and Iraq several years ago have no end in sight . At the same time, potential new confrontations emerge with new military actions in the offing . Even though the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq had a serious impact at the global scene, any new intervention is likely to complicate things additionally. There are many potential crisis spots . Further deterioration of situation in the Caucasus region is likely to provoke Russia 's strong response. A potential intervention against the Khartoum regime due to the situation in Darfour might involve China is some future conflict since it has a strategic partnership with the Sudan . Any action against Iran would trigger a crisis of global proportions with unforeseeable consequences.

It is evident that the struggle for influence and interests on the “great chess board” has largely shifted to the Central Asia and the Pacific . The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established in June 2001, comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekhistan and Kyrgyzstan, with India, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Mongolia in the observer status, is a response to USA pretensions as well as some of its Western allies in Central Asia which are already defined by their military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq , and their wish to deploy their military forces in Iran. As far as the Pacific is concerned, after the establishment of ANZUS, a military alliance comprising Australia, New Zealand and USA in 1952, to facilitate US military influence in this part of the world, they are trying to expand this alliance as an adequate response and counter-balance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization . In addition to USA , Australia and New Zealand , the backbone of the new alliance would be strengthened by Japan , South Korea and India. The recent signing of the Agreement on nuclear arms signed by India and USA and the latest developments in Myanmar should be viewed within this context.

 

It is absolutely evident that by entering NATO Serbia would risk joining the “coalition of the willing “, unwillingly, the same as other Eastern European States ( under the pressure or under the pretext that it will facilitate their further integration ), and thus risk potential confrontation or military conflict against Russia, China, Iran and many influential Islamic countries , since membership in the “coalition of the willing” does not imply solely political support to the “partners” but active engagement, i.e. preparation and deployment of its military contingents to the crises areas . It could never be in Serbia 's interest.

Therefore, Serbia 's military neutrality means military neutrality in relation to the existing and potential military interventions of the “coalition of the willing” in Central Asia and the Pacific.

On the other hand, at the moment when Serbia is politically supported by two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China , and when its positions are fully understood by Moscow and Beijing , it totally defies logic to enter a military alliance that has long-term interests directly opposed to those of Russia and China . So, Serbia runs the risk of losing the support it has and shall have in the UN Security Council . Thus Belgrade would sacrifice “something for nothing”.

As far as defense system reforms are concerned , the Serbian public is often hearing that the army is costly and that it should be reduced and professionalized – to make it less expensive. One day, when we join NATO, we shall no longer need an army since we are going to be a part of the “global security system” . I shall demonstrate on the example of Bulgaria that there is something terribly wrong with these positions.

Bulgaria is a NATO member and as of recently, an EU member . US army uses two military bases in Bulgaria . Bulgarian military air force monitors and protects the air space of two neighboring states – FYR Macedonia and Albania . Bulgaria has a large number of signed inter-State agreements and excellent cooperation with Serbia in the field of defense . Bulgaria 's remaining neighbors – R omania , Greece and Turkey are also NATO members . It can therefore be argued that Bulgaria is a part of the “global security system “ and that it is not facing any major security risk. Despite that, Sofia refused to reduce further its army from 45,000 to 19, 500 as required by NATO . From this example, we can easily see what consequences it would have on the reform of defense system of Serbia .

Lastly, the subject that cannot be avoided: the question of Serbia 's potential membership in NATO would bring to the fore the issue of interpretation and qualification of events from recent history.

By entering NATO, Serbia would directly acknowledge the legitimacy of NATO military intervention against the FRY in 1999. NATO military intervention against our country , from the point of view of international law, was an act of open aggression against a sovereign State, in accordance with the definition contained in UN General Assembly resolution 3314. Serbia and NATO will have to discuss one day this issue as well as the consequences of the aggression. It is in Serbia 's absolute interest to put the reasons and consequences of the military intervention against the FRY in true perspective . We cannot possibly accept the current explanation as the ultimate truth . Such picture is less convincing with the passage of time and it is obvious that that the story of “humanitarian intervention “ has many holes, secret motives and foul intentions . The time has come to raise the issue of depleted uranium, collateral damage, civilian victims and other consequences of air-strikes against Serbia.

Finally, it should also be pointed out that it is not in the interest of Serbia to strain its relations with NATO and that our country should surely cooperate with this military alliance . However, the cooperation does not necessarily imply NATO membership . At this moment, a sufficient measure of cooperation is the participation in the projects offered by the Partnership for Peace Program , as well as presence in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly . That is why Serbia stands make maximum profit from vast experience that the countries like Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland can offer in this field .

The author is State Secretary in the Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija

Objavljeno u: In Press, No. 2, November 2007, Brussels

 

 

 

 

 
 
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