Obrad Kesić

Getting to a Common Serbia: The State of Serbian Political Divisions and the Possibility for Building Consensus

Summary: In this article the author discusses both historical and contemporary conditions that shape the current political scene in Serbia . Investigating the shortcomings of “left” and “right”, the author concludes that each of them slowes the establishment of a much needed basic consensus for guiding Serbia on its course to become a fully democratic society. In order to reach a compromise and consensus that would represent the road to a common Serbia, the authors emphasizes the role of several decisive factors: clear identification of national interests, realization of both process and substance of democracy, criticism in respect to the demands from abroad, the recognition of the fact that all parties on the contemporary political scene are democratic and development of a constructive attitude.

Key words: left, right, compomise, consensus, democracy, common Serbia.

Serbia is a country with deep divisions between its people and throughout society. These divisions are economic, social, political, ethnic, religious, and ideological. At times Serbia appears to be a country at war with itself. Tolerance, compromise and understanding have especially been hard to come by in Serbia 's messy and fractional political arena, where the battle over power is often dominated by historic images, stereotypes, and deeply felt feelings of victim hood.

Any examination of political and social cleavages in Serbia must begin with a basic question constantly raised by Serbia 's intellectuals, politicians, columnists, and activists, how many Serbia 's are there? Some talk about the “two Serbias ” or the “other Serbia;” while others talk about “our Serbia ” and “their Serbia .”

Within these apparently mutually exclusive and uncompromising Serbias are buried many competing conflicts of ideas, ideology, and interpretations of history. Among the more important confrontations are: left versus right, liberal versus conservative, modern versus traditional, royalist versus republican, secular versus religious, patriotic versus anti-war, and of course Chetnik versus Partisan.(1) All of these divisions and different political and social options are presented by their proponents as being uncompromising, clearly defined and mutually exclusive from those advocated by their opponents. Of course theirs is the “truth,” and the only way forward for Serbia

Most of these individuals, regardless of their chosen understanding of Serbia, package their position under the rallying cries of “freedom,” “democracy,” and in many cases “reform.” Their opponents are branded as “traitors” (either to the nation or to civilization), “extremists” and users of “the language of hate.” In other words, the passion of their own convictions is only outmatched by the passion of their animosity, and even hatred, for their opponents.

All of this serves to radicalize political discourse leaving little room for compromise and almost no room for consensus. It also serves to distract attention, energy, and support for fundamental discourse over determining national interests and building public consensus for implementing policies and reforms. In return the lack of basic political consensus over national interests has internally increased political apathy, selfish individualism and a culture of irresponsibility; while externally creating a perception of a rudderless and weak state steered by cynical, visionless, indecisive and opportunistic political leaders. This in turn has complicated Serbia 's international relationships and has compounded problems such as Kosovo's status negotiations, cooperation with The Hague and the efforts to achieve membership in the European Union. Like the tumbling of dominoes, Serbia 's international complications have in turn further polarized society and increased the divisions within the already fragmented social and political fabric of the country.

Further complicating an already complex situation is the fact that political parties have yet to fully evolve ideological identities beyond simple, and often misleading, designations such as “left,” “right,” “liberal” or “nationalist.”(2) For example, the Democratic Party (DS) has traditionally enjoyed the support of what could be described as a moderate nationalist and liberal membership; however, the leadership of the late Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, the party was moved squarely into the leftist political space culminating in its membership in the Socialist International. Another example is the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) which embraces nationalist and populist rhetoric, but its social policies and many other party platforms fully fall into a socialist framework. If this political schizophrenia was not enough, there is even further confusion created over the symbols and symbolism embraced by proponents of the left and the right.(3)

The Self-Martyrdom of Serbia's Left

The left embraces and enfolds itself in the slogan of liberalism, modernization, democracy, and a modified version of the old Titoist slogan of “brotherhood and unity.” However upon closer examination these versions of democracy, modernization and even of liberalism, although loosely based to the American and EU models, are very selective at best and often misinterpretations if not open perversions.

An example of this is the left's contempt for religion and in particular for the Serbian Orthodox Church, which many in the left blame for everything from the rise of Milosevic to the inefficiency of governance.(4) They talk about democracy being essentially rooted in the concept of secularism without recognizing or understanding the importance of religion in the development of democracy, let alone showing any comprehension for the continuing role of faith and religion in today's democracy.

The founding fathers of America 's democracy were almost all pious men, who not only saw God as the creator of the world and universe, but they strongly believed that God was the giver of all human and civil rights. According to them these rights originate with God and not through the will or the benevolence of any man, be he called “king” or “ruler”. Serbia 's left embraces the principles of democracy as espoused by the American Constitution, but ignores the fundamental roots of these principles and this important document. (5)

Likewise, when it comes to current pressing issues confronting Serbia , like cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), the Kosovo status negotiations or EU and NATO membership, Serbia 's liberals and left embrace the form and not the substance of democracy. They argue that the Hague Tribunal is an essential mechanism for building a true democratic and modern state in Serbia . They argue that this tribunal forces Serbia to punish war criminals, and more importantly that it forces Serbia to acknowledge and to confront its own responsibility for the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia . In this way they argue that the ICTFY is necessary to stimulate collective repentance and to promote reconciliation with the other peoples of the former Yugoslavia . Of course, upon closer examination the true motivation behind this support and blind faith in The Hague Tribunal is much more parochial and personal. The ICTFY validates the left's own perception of victimization and justifies their own self-righteousness. In other words, the tribunal proves that it was “nationalism,” “clerical fascism” and the right that was to blame for everything: For all the murders all the destruction and all the suffering because of Yugoslavia 's disintegration. In their eyes, since they have been the only ones consistently saying this, by default, then their world view and beliefs are proven by the processes in the ICTFY. This then means that only they are right and the defenders of a truth that is the only basis for building democracy in Serbia . More importantly this proves that their enemies on the right are simultaneously disqualified from participating in democracy and have to accept the image of evil villains that the left believes them to be.(6)

The saddest aspect of the left's need for self validation and vindication is their consistent inability to separate their hatred of the right from there genuine desire for a more democratic society. As a result they are forced to choose form over substance when it comes to their promotion and understanding of democracy. They blindly support almost everything that comes from Washington and Brussels regardless of whether it is democratic or undemocratic, justified or unjustified, legitimate or illegitimate. All that matters is that it originates in the “west” and that it is at odds or in direct conflict with Serbia 's right. So when the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina behaves autocratically and undemocratically, Serbia 's left applauds because his victims are perceived to be nationalists. This draws the conclusion that the Serbian liberals and leftists hold to one basic tenant of their Marxist roots, that is the belief that “the end justify the means” or to put it in a more modern context that the goal of building democracy justifies the use of any means including undemocratic, autocratic, illegal, and even violent ones.

The very same process occurs when it comes to the Kosovo status negotiations the issue for the left takes on greater importance because of their need for self validation and vindication then the basic competing issues of sovereignty and self-determination. The loss of Kosovo would prove Serbia 's guilt not only for Milosevic's crimes, but also for the very destruction of Yugoslavia . It would also expose the emptiness of the right's arguments concerning the best way to build a modern democracy in Serbia and would ideally also cripple their popular support.

This need for self vindication and validation is Serbia 's liberals and leftist's greatest weakness even when it comes to their support of membership of the European Union and perhaps even NATO. The left's support for NATO membership has generally been uncritical and without serious reservations even when representatives of both organizations have often resorted to half hearted and insincere support for Serbia's democratization or when they have resorted to undemocratic measures in dealing with Serbia. Serbia's liberals and other members of the left have sought to draw an artificial differentiation between themselves and their nationalist and conservative opponents, ignoring the fact that support for membership in the EU is strong across all segments of Serbia's political spectrum. Likewise the lack of support for full NATO membership also reflects across all segments of Serbia 's political spectrum.

This blind, almost reflexive, support for all things NATO or EU often puts Serbia 's left on the defensive and prompts them to assume a martyr-like stance isolating them from most segments of Serbian society and from which they lash out at their opponents. In so doing they in fact strike the mainstream of Serbian society, even individuals who tend to sympathize with the left. This undermines both the appeal and the credibility of this political option and helps push them into even greater marginalization, self-righteous indignation and alienation. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the area of human rights, civil rights and war crimes.

The individuals and organizations that have come to represent the mainstream of advocates for human and civil rights, as well as the supporters of bringing those charged with war crimes to justice are almost all, without exception leftists and self proclaimed liberals. Many of them were members of the League of Communists of Serbia and most became involved in this area during Milosevic's reign in power. They have become equal measure advocates and politicians as they rarely miss an opportunity to involve themselves in almost all political debates within the country. The fact that they do this in a purely and openly partisan way, always in opposition to Serbia 's conservatives, nationalist or rightist, has eroded any claims that they make to being above politics. Their silence on issues such as the human rights violations and crimes committed during the communists period; the gross human and civil rights violations committed during “Operation Saber” and their refusal to criticize or condemn the corruption or illegal actions of the DOS governments and of wealthy businessmen that support them have all created a justified public perception that these human rights activists are in fact politicians of another type. The fact that they legitimately criticize the excesses violations and misdeeds of the conservatives and nationalists is distorted by their unbridled willingness to engage in partisan politics in such a one-sided way.

The result has been that Serbia now lacks a credible and legitimate base for the advocacy of human rights, civil rights and justice for victims of war crimes. Even the essential and good work that the current partisan advocates do in this field is marginalized, unrecognized and mostly misunderstood by the public. This creates a noticeable vacuum in an area that is important for the consolidation and maintenance of Serbia 's democracy.

Clearly, the self-proclaimed “other Serbia ” has greatly contributed to the inflexibility and uncompromising posturing that has come to define Serbia 's political landscape. Although decrying intolerance and the use of “the language of hate,” the liberals and left have helped perpetuate these things. However, they are only one part of Serbia 's political immaturity. (7)

Paranoia, Patriotism and Persecution Complex of the Right

Serbia 's conservatives, nationalists and rightists have equal responsibilities for divisive, ugly and rigid politics. They have done their share in obstructing progress in building essential consensus for the consolidation of Serbia 's democratic transition.

Serbia 's right has in particular played into the fears, legitimate and illegitimate, of Serbia 's left. Primarily, they have added substance to the perception that they are retrograde, paranoid and indecisive and that they are intent on undermining Serbia 's reforms and Serbia 's bid to join the EU. They have done this in a variety of ways, both consciously and sub consciously. First, many embraced the communist stereotypical characterization of “nationalist” and the “right.” The imagery of the long-haired, bearded wild men clutching knives in their teeth or firearms in their hands has been transferred from the propagandistic films of Veljko Bulajic to a reality embraced by a significant minority of Serbia 's nationalists. Many of their goals, beliefs and ideas are presented straight from the pop culture of communists Yugoslavia . What used to be a symbolic form of protest and individualism by anti-communists has now become a mainstream caricature of Serbian nationalism. It would be very difficult to find any legitimate substance of the ideas that they have in name embraced from Pasic, Garasanin, or even from Draza Mihailovic.

Not only does this show the comprehensive success of over four decades of communist propaganda, but it also shows the relative shallow political maturity, lack of identity and self confidence of Serbia 's nationalists and other members of the political right. This superficiality undermines their convictions and there ability to create a coherent and appealing political identity that would create a much more vibrant and dynamic advocate for voters that identify themselves as being right on Serbia's political spectrum. This creates not only a serious weakness for this political option but it also creates a political schizophrenia that taints their views and confuses many of their voters. The struggle between the legacy of their anti-communist and democratic roots with their inherited (conditioned) leftist sympathies concerning social and economic issues has often pitted Serbia 's conservatives and nationalists against themselves and has limited their ability to effectively express a vision for Serbia 's future. This can also be illustrated in their reluctance to redress the crimes of the communists. For example, their hesitant and half hearted support for restoring nationalized property or compensating former owners illustrates this internal struggle between their anti-communist heritage and their socialist conditioned mind set.

When this is added to the perception that Serbia 's conservatives and other members of the right are paranoid proponents of the global conspiracy school of thought then it becomes clear why the liberals and left refuse to see any ground for compromise with their political opponents. In large part the right has helped create this conspiracy obsessed, isolationist perception of themselves. The biggest factor contributing to the creation of this perception has been the right's own persecution complex and their inability to differentiate between relevant and important battles that need to be fought and those of little or no importance when it comes to Serbia's international relations. As a result, if everything is a matter of the gravest importance or is presented as being a matter of “to be or not to be” then really nothing in the end is of this importance. This is why many of the positions of advocated by members of the right are perceived as being unprincipled, vindictive or reactionary. Not only does this put Serbia in a constant defensive posture in its relationships with other states it also insures that the mobilization of public support and consensus needed to defend Serbia 's interest can rarely be achieved and at enormous emotional and psychological costs. As the public becomes exhausted by constantly fighting “monumental” battles against unfavorable odds and antagonistic international threat and it becomes a type of self fulfilling prophecy that almost insures failure because political energy is wasted and misdirected in a constant struggle that can never be won. The conservatives and other members of Serbia's right seam too comfortable with the perception that the whole world is against Serbia and that nothing can be achieved given that the odds for success are so minimal and given that the world is ruled on the basis of “might makes right” this is a convenient way of avoiding responsibility and of compromising basic principles without paying any political cost. An example of this needless waste of energy and political capital has been the talk by some conservatives and members of the right about the real motives behind the US and European support for an independent Kosovo. They have put this in the conspiratorial framework that this was all part of a broader desire on the part of America and some European countries to create a “NATO state.”

These statements have perhaps served to mobilize internal support, but this support is redundant as it is limited to those who already firmly oppose Kosovo's independence and it is damaging in that it alienates part of these supporters, who do not share this conspiratorial view of that question. Furthermore this charge has only further antagonized Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris making them less receptive to give validity to legitimate Serbian concerns, making them more skeptical of Serbia's commitment for a negotiated settlement and putting into question Serbia's determination to complete reforms and actions necessary for EU membership. The charges of a hidden agenda leading to the creation of a NATO state out of Kosovo ignored the reality that the US is overstretched in its international commitments and as a result, is desperate to end its troop commitment in the Balkans. The major shortage of available troops has already reached critical proportions affecting vital American interests from Iran to the continuing the war against terror. Of course, the chosen American policy of supporting an independent Kosovo would seem to necessitate a long term troop commitment, but its foundation was built on the mistaken American belief that the easiest road to troop withdrawal was to be found in avoiding conflict with Albanian extremists by fully satisfying their desire for independence. In addition, the bigger threat of violence and conflict has been one sidedly Albanian, allowing the US to take for granted Serbia 's claims of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This intentional or unintentional misunderstanding of America's goals in Kosovo has only served to convince many liberals and leftists in Serbia that the conservatives and nationalists have once again revealed their primary anti-Western beliefs and that they were intentionally steering Serbia to isolations, economic stagnation and the possibility of new conflicts. Conservatives and nationalists on the other hand, saw these attacks and denunciations from the left as being proof of their blind subservience to everything coming from Washington and Brussels , and perhaps even proof of the left's outright defeatism and/or treachery. In this case, as well as others, the right has shown the same type of reckless demagoguery that has also been a favorite tactic of the left and that has greatly contributed to Serbia's destructive political discourse. This has been the motor powering the fragmentation of political space in the country and has slowed the establishment of a much needed basic consensus for guiding Serbia on its course to become a “normal” country.

New Hope for Compromise and Consensus

Given the interlinkages and layered nature of Serbia 's problems, it is easy to lose hope and to embrace the zero some gain of political discourse that has come to characterize Serbian society and politics. Nonetheless, there are signs and indications within Serbia that the dynamics of political discourse can change for the better, but in order for this to happen, several things need to occur.

Before discussing the needed steps to evolve Serbia 's political landscape into the more democratic, tolerant and confident levels needed for building national consensus and political stability, it is important to identify significant developments that lead to the optimistic assessment that such change is realistically achievable. The most important factor leading to this new hope was the death of Slobodan Milosevic. This has had a multiplier effect on creating better conditions for improving Serbia 's chances for political normalcy and stability. First, his death removed any fear of any type of relapse to the Milosevic era and it all but ended this dark chapter of Serbia 's history. Second, his death empowered the Socialist Party in Serbia , allowing this party to redefine itself in accordance to the substance of issues and not in support of maintaining Milosevic's cult of personality in the parallel reality that he created to avoid responsibility and allow his autocratic hold on power. The SPS has now been able to gain an important foothold in Serbia 's political landscape that will only increase as they continue to unburden themselves of Milosevic's political baggage. His death has also positioned the party to soon become a potential acceptable coalition partner for all of Serbia 's other political parties, both on the left and on the right. This in turn has contributed to greater political stability and greater flexibility within Serbia 's limited political space.

Milosevic's death has liberated Serbia from a significant element of external pressures that have directly hampered reforms and undermined internal stability effectively blocking the development of a more tolerant political culture. From its inception the Hague Tribunal has interfered with Serbia's democratic transition by undermining public confidence and support for Serbia's government and its institutions and this has dissolved support for difficult reforms by helping to introduce a point of conflict and division among Serbia's democratic parties. In addition, the Tribunal has helped perpetuate the belief of unfair prosecution, international conspiracy and overall victimization that have been the linchpin perpetuating support for populous politics. When this is added to the undermining of Serbia's own fragile democratic institutions, especially with regard to the courts and the establishment of the rule of law, as well as the Tribunal's outright failure to contribute to reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, then there is little wonder why Serbia has had to embrace a more hesitant and cautious approach to reforms. Milosevic's death has marginalized the Hague Tribunal and has allowed the EU to make more decisive steps to firmly set a course for Serbia's more rapid acceptance in this organization.

Another important development for the evolution of Serbia 's politics to a more mature and responsible level has been the unity generated by the Kosovo status question. The consensus and unity of position on the part of most of Serbia's political parties has created the only issue, since Milosevic's removal from power that has in effect served to unify both public support and political leadership, allowing for greater room for building consensus on other important issues such as the ratification of a new constitution and completion of reforms that would consolidate democratic institutions and lead to the full establishment of the rule of law. This issue has proven to be especially important in that it has been the only political bridge that has completely linked the SPS and the radicals on one side with the majority of their formerly bitter opponents from Serbia 's democratic opposition. Other than the desire for power, no other issue has been able to overcome the entrenched animosity and hostility that has separated these political options and that had served to maintain an artificial barrier that has only prevented political parties from assuming their natural and normal place within Serbia 's political arena. The issue of Kosovo has shown that consensus on vital and state interests is possible, and more importantly, that political consensus can lead to success in the countries international relations. The issue of Kosovo has also pushed Serbia to finally and more confidently act like a real state and this has been a stabilizing factor for Serbia 's internal politics.

One of the most positive developments for Serbia 's political stability has been the partial but significant evolution of the Radical Party (SRS). The decision of the SRS to willingly give up the position of the president of Serbia 's parliament has marked an important milestone for Serbia 's political evolution. The Radicals not only proved that they are able to act responsibly, but they clearly showed that they fully respected both the written rules of democratic politics as well as the unwritten intent of these rules – compromise and sacrifice of parochial interest for the greater good of one's state. The radicals could have put their own interest for power and the protection of Tomislav Nikolic's pride above the state's interests for stability; and they could have in this way plunged the country into yet another prolonged political crisis that would have paralyzed reform, crippled Serbia's bid for EU membership and in the end undermined Serbia's case for preserving its sovereignty over Kosovo. This would have of course led to greater alienation and fragmentation amongst Serbia 's citizens. By resigning, Nikolic and his party showed that they had enough maturity to join the ranks of political parties in Serbia that could be described as democratic. No longer could they legitimately be classified solely on the basis of their previous support for Milosevic's autocratic and undemocratic regime. These positive developments have created more space for greater responsibility on the part of Serbia 's political actors and have directly contributed to strengthening a stable political environment. They also opened the way for the current delicate coalition between the Democratic Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and have allowed for the first major substantive debate over national interests generated over the issue of the desirability of full NATO membership. Unfortunately, all of these developments are fragile and can be quickly reversed by either a complete breakdown in the limited consensus generated by the issue of Kosovo status or by the uncertainty that would be greeted by any economic crisis. External factors will also continue to have great influence over Serbia 's political stability and political discourse and these forces may also endanger stability. Serbia's possible humiliation over the loss of Kosovo and its inability to gain fair and equitable treatment from the EU and America over such issues as membership in the EU, a greater liberalization of Visa requirements, the preservation of the Republic of Srpska as an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina as guaranteed by the Dayton accords and its inability to affect better protection for the interests of Serbs in neighboring states, all can directly undermine stability within Serbia itself. This would most probably trigger a radicalization in public attitudes that would find expression in antiwestern sentiments and would create a fertile ground for the aggressive, vindictive, populist politics that could endanger democracy in Serbia and the stability in the Balkans.

The Road to a Common Serbia

In order to limit this destructive scenario, is it important that Serbia 's political parties attempt to do several things.

•  National interests need to be clearly identified and as much as possible a consensus for achieving these interests has to be established.

•  political parties must emphasize both process and substance in their advocacy of democracy

•  Serbia 's politicians and parties must be more critical in embracing advice, suggestions, and demands from abroad.

•  having buried Slobodan Milosevic , Serbia 's political leaders must now bury all of the destructive elements of his legacy including the artificial barrier between “democratic” and “undemocratic” political parties that was created and only had relevance during his rule

•  political parties must identify themselves on the basis of what they stand for and not on the basis of what they oppose

All of this would lead to building a durable and stable environment for political discourse in Serbia . It is essential that a general consensus be developed over national interest that would then allow political parties to define themselves according to the issues and not continue to linger in personality politics and cheap sloganeering. The preservation and defense of Serbia's sovereignty, the stimulation of economic growth, the promotion of greater individual freedoms, the desire for greater protection of minorities, the promotion of further efficiency and responsibility of government institutions, and the establishment of the rule of law as well as perhaps advocacy for membership in the EU may offer a starting framework of issues around which general public and political consensus is possible. The establishment of national interest and any consensus that can be generated would allow Serbia 's political parties to more confidently compete in the battle of ideas without consistently being distracted by peripheral and parochial issues or by inflexible international factors.

Political actors must also continue to embrace both the substance and process of building democracy. In other words, the idea that the end, “democracy,” justifies the means must be abandoned as a guiding principle of Serbian politics. Democracy cannot be constructed out of materials of intolerance, hatred, fear and a disregard for the rules of the game. Undemocratic methods and actions lead to crises, conflict, and disillusionment; none of which can produce favorable conditions for the growth of true democracy. No political party or political leader in Serbia is indispensable, and none are more important or equal to the state. This distinction has often been lost on Serbia 's political actors, every personal defeat was characterized as a defeat for Serbia , but any personal victory rarely has translated into a collective victory for Serbia . As a result, any means and methods were acceptable because the greater good (individual interests of leaders and parties) demanded political victory and by definition, a complete defeat of all and any opponents.

This also applies to Serbia 's relations with other countries, especially with America and the EU. In order of importance and priority, Serbia 's political actors must firmly place building democracy within Serbia over any external factors, including membership in the EU. Democracy cannot be imported and no external force will solve Serbia 's problems. If Serbia 's political actors are incapable or lack the will to do it themselves. The values and principles of democracy must be applied equally to Serbia and to the outside world. If the EU and America choose to violate international law and to behave undemocratically, Serbia 's political leaders and political parties that advocate democracy must confront Washington and Brussels or else their advocacy of democracy will continue to be perceived as either being superficial or even cynical. There can be no double standards, hypocrisy or hesitation in opposing undemocratic manifestations regardless of whether they are committed by Serbs, other Europeans, or by Americans.

This point is especially important if public support for democratic reform is to be maintained. For centuries, the peoples of the Balkans have been subjected to the dictum that “might makes right.” This was understood to mean that the strongest decide, even when it came to the issues of life and death; and that the weak could only passively accept these decisions. Communism, Milosevic and now much of the behavior of the US and the EU has reinforced this message. This is dangerous not only because it provides a cynical framework for building democracy and the establishment of the rule of law, but it also implies that any change is only possible through violence. Finally, given the fragile nature of democracy in Serbia , the adolescent weakness of its political culture and the array of external and internal challenges, it is essential that any self imposed obstacles to a democratic evolution of politics be removed whenever possible. In Serbia's case, this means abandoning the crutch of Slobodan Milosevic and his legacy, this does not however mean the abandoning the process of bringing to justice or to light the crimes and criminals of his regime, but it does mean abandoning the political manipulation that has only served to delay responsible governance and accountability of all aspects of Serbia's society especially in politics. The SPS and the SRS cannot continue to be used by “democratic” parties as an excuse for their own immaturity, shortcomings and failures; and more importantly, they can no longer be used as the bogeymen to scare voters into fearfully blindly supporting political options that only offer an alternative in name only. Not only have the SPS and the SRS proven that they have accepted the essential rules of democratic politics but often they have shown greater maturity and responsibility than their opponents. The Radicals, of course, would complete their transformation by distancing themselves from the ramblings, venom, and paranoid world vision of Vojislav Seselj, but in the end, if they fail to do so, this would only serve to continue to undermine their own appeal to a great number of Serbia 's apathetic or undecided voters. It is nearly inevitable that the Radicals will come to power in the near future in a coalition of some kind with one or more of the current ruling parties. This would mark a normal evolution in Serbian politics and is not any cause for great concern or for continuing the politics of fear. The sooner that this becomes an acceptable part of Serbia's political discourse, then the sooner that Serbia can firmly establish a stable and functional democracy that would consolidate political and economic reforms and empower a more responsible, tolerant, and democratic political culture.

None of this will be easy and in themselves will guarantee neither stability nor prosperity for Serbia 's citizens. For that to happen, many other factors have to fall in place. However, it is clear that Serbia 's democracy is much more resilient and healthier that many critics both within and outside of Serbia would care to admit. Serbia's dysfunctional, destructive and intolerant political discourse that has characterized much of its past does not have to do so for its future; but for this to happen, political parties and leaders; both on the left and right, liberal and conservative, of “that,” “this” and “the other Serbia” must be more honest, responsible and mature in both the language and substance of their political discourse. In the end, Serbia will only be able to consolidate and maintain its democracy through the determination, commitment, and consensus built by its peoples, political parties and leaders. It definitely will not be attained in the form of a gift from or in response to pressure from Brussels or Washington.

ENDNOTES

1. Although none of these classifications are clearly defined and necessarily mutually exclusive, this work will refer to any political or ideological classifications in the context used by the proponents of these convictions and that they usually use to describe themselves.
2. Serbia 's liberals and conservatives often do not always reflect the convictions, ideology or basic descriptions of the normally accepted meanings associated with these classifications; as a result they are used in this work in the context of their common usage in Serbia and by the advocates of each political grouping.
3. When discussing left and right political options in Serbia , this work limits its focus to the main political parties, ignoring extreme fringe or marginal movements hovering around both political groupings. For the most part the Socialist Party is not part of the left as described in this paper mostly because it itself has not really defined itself in the was this term has been generally used in the context of Serbia's political differences and also because they are not accepted in this grouping by the other political parties and organizations that have firmly appropriated this political space. As the SPS begins to function in line with its own rhetoric and pronouncements and as they increase their disassociation from the Milosevic's legacy, they will increase their control over this space. To a lesser extent the same can be said about the SRS and their relationship to Vojislav Seselj.
4. The left's attacks on the Serbian Orthodox Church are an interesting convergence of decades of ant-religious and atheist communist propaganda with the modern rhetoric of democratic secularism. One of the most offensive and vicious anti-Christian attacks actually used no words, written or spoken, it was a cartoon drawn by the renowned cartoonist, Corax, of a kneeling Orthodox Bishop Pahomije (who at the time was charged with child molestation) mimicking prayer before a crucified Christ but in his thoughts was lust for a naked and backward crucified Christ published in Danas (22 April 2003).
5. For an excellent account of the importance of faith to America 's founders see Founding Brothers: the Revolutionary Generation by Joseph J. Ellis (Vintage Books, 2002).
6. Another example of this emotional and personal need for vindication and validation by many in the left is their bitter denunciation of the International Court of Justice's ruling that cleared Serbia of direct responsibility for committing genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where as the ICTFY judgments that affirmed a collective responsibility that could be used to condemn Serbia collectively and that were embraced and cheered by most of the liberals the ICJ ruling was condemned as a gross miscarriage of justice and as a political concession to Belgrade .
7. The passionate and uncompromising discourse among Serbia 's political actors, analysts and activists has best been captured in a series of polemical exchanges during the past few years. Among the more interesting were: the three month long debate provoked by the article “Dehelsinkizacija gospode Biserko” by Dragoljub Zarkovic published in Vreme in August 2002, the exchanges between Vesna Pesic and Slobodan Samardzic concerning the “case of Ivan Stambolic” in the pages of Danas in April - May 2003, two extended debates in Nova Srpska Politicka Misao , Vreme and Nin prompted by two articles, “Misionarska inteligencija u danasnjoj Srbiji” and “Srpski sen zist i petookobarski montanjari” written by Slobodan Antonic in Spring 2003 ( Vreme ) and in Fall 2004 ( NIN ) and the debate triggered by a two-part critical profile of Latinka Perovic written by Zoran Cirijakovic published in Nin (13/04/06 and 20/04/06).

Obrad Kesić

Stići do zajedničke Srbije: srpske političke podele i mogućnost uspostavljanja konsenzusa

Sažetak: U ovom članku autor razmatra istorijske i savremene uslove koji oblikuju političku scenu Srbije. Istražujući promašaje i „levice“ i „desnice“ autor zaključuje da obe usporavaju uspostavljanje neophodnog konsenzusa, na temelju kojeg Srbija može da postane potpuno razvijeno demokratsko društvo. Autor ističe ulogu nekoliko faktora koji su odlučujući za kompromis i konsenzus: jasna identifikacija nationalnih interesa, realizacija i procesa i supstance demokratije, veća kritičnost u pogledu zahteva koji dolaze spolja, priznanje činjenice da su trenutno sve stranke na političkoj sceni demokratske i razvijanje konstruktivnog stava.

Ključne reči: levica, desnica, kompromis, konsenzus, demokratija, zajednička Srbija.