Djordje Vukadinovic

Kosovo Rubicon

Kosovo crisis has already proven as a true tomb for numerous, allegedly reliable political assessments and prognoses. Let's remember how many times and with how much sureness it has been published that it would all be finished before the end of 2006! Then again in January, March, May, June, September, and December 2007. How much talks were there about the session of the Security Council where a "new resolution, based on Marty Ahtisary's proposal" would be adopted? That is why today even the persons familiar with Serbian political circumstances usually do not dare make development prognoses after 10 December. Yet, almost all of them agree that by the end of this or the beginning of next year moves will be made in Pristina , Washington , Brussels and Belgrade that will definitely change the Kosovo status quo and that such move will have far-reaching consequences not only in the region, but also in the global international relations. Keeping the existing situation unchanged is, allegedly, unbearable and one has to "move ahead" where the "ahead" is first shy and euphemistic, and then only one exclusive option – Kosovo independence is suggested during the last months.

But, how did it happen that a still local Serbian and Balkans' issue, became one of the two or three central issues (in addition to Iran, Iraq and area beyond Caucasus) and, so to say, the turning point of actual world politics?

Small mistakes – big damage

Let's, for the moment, leave aside the outstanding symbolic status Kosovo has in Serbian history and Serbian national awareness building. This, naturally, is not unimportant, but we would say that it was all the matter of the series of wrong decisions and assessments about Kosovo issue made by various stakeholders in the long time period.

The Serbs first generally underestimated the scale of demographic problem in Kosovo. Head-spinning natural growth of Albanian population, combined with pogroms during Nazi occupation and systematic half-century pressure imposed on non-Albanians made the Kosovo Serbs an absolute and increasingly hopeless minority. In the period before and directly after World War II, Serbian authorities wrongly believed that Kosovo problem could be solved with increased police repression on Albanian population, and since the end of the sixties communistic regime was dragging to completely different extreme, trying to pacify the aspirations of ethnic Albanians by giving Kosovo broad autonomy and constitutive semi-state status within the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavian (Con) Federation. Milosevic wrongly believed that Kosovo problem, after its autonomy level had been reduced and partially police-based regime established in the Province at the beginning of the nineties, was really solved and he left it to the care of his incompetent and corrupted local staff. His biggest mistake was probably that he believed he could play games with Kosovo and make political manipulations.

On the other hand, western political factors, mostly Americans, wrongly believed – if they really did – that Kosovo issue was of prevailingly humanitarian nature, and not the conflict between two hardly reconcilable rights, two ethnic groups, and two state-constituting interests, as well as among several regional interests. They did wrong when they, without approval from the UN Security Council, without any legal or sufficiently ethical grounds, bombarded Serbia , i.e. SR Yugoslavia because of Kosovo. They made an even bigger mistake when they additionally tried to somehow justify this act by supporting a picture of "genocide over Albanians" and of Ghandi - like resistance of the later, systematically concealing the facts of criminal acts, crimes committed by ethnic Albanians and inhuman conditions the remaining Kosovo Serbs managed to survive in.

Besides, misled by wrong information from their filed commissionaires, western officials were wrongly assessing the degree the Serbs` interest in Kosovo. They wrongly thought that "Kostunica was only bluffing", that Tadic would recognize Kosovo independence in the end, and that Kosovo was "only at 5 – 6 position among the priorities of Serbian voters". They were making wrong estimations of the Russian position and possible role in the Kosovo crisis, continuously warning their Belgrade counterparts not to count on Russian veto in the Security Council, that Putin would make a deal with Bush and that "the Russians would betray them in the end". What is worst, with such policy and direct or indirect promises to ethnic Albanians that their independence is guaranteed "as a reward for all they had suffered under Milosevic", the Kosovo Albanians were so strongly sensitized that now, no matter how favourable an option is offered to them, except independence, they take it as the end of the world and as exceptionally unjust.

Finally, a part of Serbian anti-Milosevic opposition seem to have taken their own motto "Kosovo issue is, in fact, a democratic issue" too seriously and, contrary to the experience and common sense, believed that Kosovo crises had started with Slobodan Milosevic and would end with his departure. In addition, a part of this Serbian opposition corpus which came to power after 5 October 2000, experienced Kosovo as a burden and tried to get rid of it as soon as possible, while they believed, wrongly again, to have support or at least passive approval of majority of Serbian citizens blinded with the glitter of European stars and hypermarkets. They were wrong.

All have made little mistakes and now all can easily be at a loss, but, of course, the Serbs especially. But the Albanians, the United States , western interests, regional stability and "European Cause" in Serbia can also be at a big loss, let alone the international order and justice. And I believe that now many see that the status quo from the beginning of this text could, in fact, be a better or less bad solution for all. It is, however, a big question whether there is at all a pilot in this plane – and whether there is enough time to have someone change the course and "pull the emergency brake".

Is Serbia & Russia prophecy coming true by itself?

Beyond doubt, Serbian-American relations are first to be sacrificed in most recent pressures towards Kosovo independence. Even the air strikes against Serbia in 1999 and over-biased attitude of Washington and Brussels during longer period of Balkans crisis could not significantly destabilize the unquestioned pro-western attitude within significant part of Serbian public, especially Serbian elite. According to investigations, the citizens have had more balanced attitudes, but still rather confused, partly due to the effects of continuous west-oriented propaganda, and partly due to repeatedly failing expectations of Russian support during the nineties. However, the manner in which the U.S.A. push Kosovo independence, especially the arrogant and common sense humiliating "argumentation" with which American officials, like Nicholas Burns and Daniel Freed, explain why such solution would be both good and just for Serbia, can very easily result in deeper re-consideration or even change of Serbian post-fifth-October political course. In the long term, regardless of all media-political simulations, it will be difficult to explain the Serbs why a better friend is the one who grabs away something from them than the one who, though unsuccessfully, tries to help them keep something that belongs to them already.

Who wouldn't like to have the biggest world power as an ally? The more so as the generations of those who presently have the final say in Serbian politics and public life were essentially brought up in the strong multi-partial spirit which, partly authentically and partly due to many-decade resistance to communistic dogma, emphasized an almost cultic attitude towards the tradition of American liberalism and “American way of life”. This attitude of slightly uncritical adoration spread to practically all spheres, from sub-culture, Disneyland, Hollywood and jazz to political organization and political philosophy. For example, Vojislav Kostunica – presently the main suspect for “eastern sin” and alleged anti-western turning of Serbian politics, did not in his youth translate Lenin and Chernisevsky, but The Federalist Papers written by Hamilton, Jay and Madison – this almost holy book of American political thought.

Therefore, knowing the major part of Serbian political establishment, one can say with certainty that – with possible exception of Tomislav Nikolic, though he also had his “ Atlantic ” and Americano Phil phase during the nineties – all of them would like to have the U.S.A. on their side in the ongoing Kosovo conflict or at least to be able to count on more or less balanced attitude of the United States regarding that issue. But, they cannot. And there is no longer any use in closing eyes in front of such reality, in front of the fact that any text or analysis in the western media, talking of the Russian attitude in negotiations about Kosovo, as a sort of explanation, is necessarily accompanied by the remark of Moscow being "traditional ally of the Serbs". In other words, the western media remind us of what many have forgotten or are trying to forget here.

And this is presumably greatest paradox in the entire geopolitical confusion. Due to doubts about the Serbs being traditionally inclined to Moscow and Russian interests, the west has been continuously taking the position contrary to Serbian national interests in practically all issues (Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo) and this, at the end of the story, can result in Serbia's turning to the east, though its elite have been feverishly rushing for the west. Strict military neutrality and a balanced, pragmatic attitude towards the United States , the European Union, and Russia are, at the most, best things that the west can expect from Serbia .

The author is editor in chief of the New Serbian Political Thought magazine.

Objavljeno u: In Press, No. 2, November 2007, Brussels