Dejan Vuk Stankovic

KOSOVO AND SERBIAN POLITICAL SCENE

Serbian political scene at the end of 2007 is characterized with two major events – the outcome of Kosovo-Metohian crisis and forthcoming election. The approaching 10 December, designated among the prevailing portion of the international community as D Day for the resolution of the Kosovo-Metohian problem and most probable date of election (the period from the first week of January until March 2008) undoubtedly suggests that the course of the coming campaign and prospects of some presidential candidates would be directly connected to their attitudes and positions during the resolving of Kosovo-Metohian crisis.

One of the realistic and, according to some western political circles, possibly most realistic resolutions could be unilateral proclamation of independence by Albanian ethnic majority in Kosovo, as well as the recognition of such independence by the U.S.A. and the EU, in spite of the decision of the UN Security Council.

Regardless the fact that the Kosovo-Metohian issue is considered a complex state-wise and historical topic within which it is not possible to precisely determine concrete losers and winners on a political scene, it is beyond any doubt that the mentioned Albanian-western, or, more precisely, Albanian-American model of Kosovo crisis resolution could have far-reaching effects in media-related and political positioning and prospects of candidates running in the forthcoming presidential election.

According to what has been heared in public, three politically important candidates will be running for presidential position: actual President of Serbia and Democratic Party leader – Boris Tadic, Deputy President of Serbian Radical Party – Tomislav Nikolic, and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader – Cedomir Jovanovic. Coalition partner of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and Vojislav Kostunica as its leader and the President of the Government of Serbia – Velimir Ilic, the leader of New Serbia (NS) can be added to this list of politically relevant candidates. In spite of his confirming announcements, it is not known for sure whether Ilic is going to run for presidential election or not. Respecting legitimate political and human ambition of LDP leader, as well as of potential candidate of NS and Kostunica's DSS, main competition to decide the winner will take place between the actual President Tadic and most influential leader of the opposition – Nikolic. As the competences of the two politicians are of key relevance for the outcome of presidential election, the issue is raised of the assessment of their political positions in the light of a rather probable application of Albanian-western model of the Kosovo-Metohian crises resolution.

At first site, it looks like Tadic and Nikolic do not have especially conflicted views of the Kosovo-Metohian issue. Radicals' support to the policy of strong opposing to Kosovo and Metohia's independence which has lately been consistently advocated by the President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, together with the President of Serbian Government, Kostunica, slightly relieved and put aside the spirit of perpetual conflicts in the relation DS – SRS. Still, regardless of the visible and repeatedly confirmed consensus of leading Serbian parties on Kosovo and Matohia, there is a deep difference between ideological positions of SRS and DS that will, both directly and indirectly, reflect on the course and outcome of presidential election, the more so if it were conducted in the shadow of Kosovo's (self-proclaimed) independence.

Ideologically, politically and value-wise, Democratic Party of Boris Tadic presents itself as a promoter of intrinsic political, economic and social reforms and as most loud advocate of fastest possible Serbia 's joining the EU and the NATO. Tensions between western attitude toward the Kosovo and Metohia issue on one side and the state policy on the other point to almost endemic delicacy of Boris Tadic's position. At the same instant, his pro-Euro-Atlantic orientation has been seriously destabilized by the attitude of the EU and the NATO when it comes to the resolution of Kosovo and Metohia's status.

As the President of Serbia, at the moment of possible proclamation of Kosovo and Metohia's independence and its recognition by the U.S.A and the EU, Tadic will, according to the letter of the Constitution, have to at least send a strong protest note to the West. Tadic will be obliged to such a strong response not only by his previous state policy, but also by preferences of large portion of voters of his party (according to the findings of Politicum Agency's research, as many as about 55 per cent of DS followers prefer defence of Kosovo and Metohia to European integration). Thus, any sort of quick and unexpected President Tadic's deviation from the actual state policy relating Kosovo and enhancement of the spirit of Euro-Atlantic values would be not only unambiguous inconsistency, but also a unique political death leap , both concerning the mentioned preferences of his followers and political partnership with Kostunica and DSS and NS of Velimir Ilic, who hold clearly strong position regarding Kosovo and Metohia's independence.

To have it more delicate, radical opposing of the first favourite of the future presidential race to the West would aggravate his good relations with the U.S.A. and the EU. It is most probable that strong Tadic's opposing to the West would not be taken only as tactics in the ongoing political struggle in Serbia . In addition, potential anti-west deviation of DS would have internal political consequences and open the possibilities to LDP to gain political profit from such forced and instant anti-west rhetoric of DS leader.

Nevertheless, western support to Albanians' request for independence puts the main promoter and agent of reforms in Serbia into very difficult political and promotional position. In the first step, it makes the division to pro-western, reform-oriented forces on one side and anti-western and conservative forces on the other – difficult, while, in the second step, makes the followers of transition reforms most probable losers on national and state level.

What makes realistic and serious problem for Tadic, also makes tactical and political advantages for Nikolic. Essentially, Nikolic and his party will and can by no means be satisfied if the West recognized Kosovo's independence. The reason for claiming so is clear – Kosovo's independence is radically conflicted with program principles of SRS. Yet, recognition of Kosovo's independence by the EU and the U.S.A. easily fits into Radicals' picture of Serbian historical and political reality where the conflict of Serbia with western world as a whole dominates.

The announced western support to ethnic Albanians in the struggle for independence opens the possibility for perpetuating of an old Radicals' story of the theory of conspiracy against the Serbs and for strengthening of ideological thesis of anti-European course of Serbia , with unavoidable addition of Russophilia . In the presidential race Nikolic can be convincing in enhancing anti-western attitude as a gesture of resistance and protest due to Kosovos' independence, while the story about the EU can with no problem be presented as something opposed to the interests of Serbia , if it came out that the EU had advocated and stood for Kosovo and Metohia's independence.

In the light of western recognition of Kosovo and Metohia's independence, democratic promotional matrix – the everlasting division to reformists and anti-reformists – though it will be made problematic and denied, with unavoidable addition of traditional Radicals' social demagogy and critic of moral corruption of authorities – is almost completely worn out. If we add that election body of Radicals is disciplined and numerous and that Radicals can find sources of votes among former voters of Socialists and of Bogoljub Karic, it becomes obvious that chances of Tomislav Nikolic, in case of realization of this American Kosovo related scenario, would be neither small nor unserious.

An act of unilateral recognition of Kosovo would also produce consequences to other stakeholders of presidential race. Within people's coalition DSS – NS degree of resistance to American policy in the Balkans would increase and so would the number of pro-Russian political orientation followers. Further weakening of their already weak Euro-Atlantic enthusiasm would make their support to pro-European oriented Tadic in the second run of presidential election even more difficult. And that support is, considering all relevant factors, one of major preconditions of his triumph over Nikolic.

To conclude, the forthcoming presidential election that would be conducted in the shadow of unilaterally proclaimed and west-recognized independence of Kosovo and Metohia could be the turning point on Serbian political scene. Namely, up to the present linkage of reform processes with accession to the EU and the NATO would in such case come in direct conflict with vital state interest of preservation of territorial wholeness of the country and its constitutional and legal sovereignty. In such circumstances there is considerable space for arrival or return to power of SRS, the party that has never completely given up one of its fundamental geo-political, economic and social postulates of Serbia of the nineties.

Space for return of the old regime forces lies in internal inconsistency of reform agenda and state policy based on real-political reasoning of the protection of territory and constitutional order, public opinion situation and strong conservative opposition. In the light of these circumstances, it is more than obvious that unilateral recognition of Kosovo and Metohia in the months or weeks preceding presidential election could produce bad consequences on both the prospects of the key ''reforming-democratic'' presidential candidate at the election and global west world interests in the region.

The author is an associate of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade.

Objavljeno u: In Press, No. 2, November 2007, Brussels